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• Continued Cost and Schedule Improvements in DOD’s MDAP Portfolio 
 
• Increased Focus on Truly Understanding Requirements 
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Selected Findings from GAO’s Analysis of DOD’s 
Portfolio of Major Defense Acquisition Programs  
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Objectives 
This is GAO's 14th annual assessment of DOD weapon system acquisitions, an area that 
has been on GAO's high-risk list for 24 years. The report assessed selected weapon 
programs in DOD’s  fiscal year 2015 major defense acquisition portfolio.  
Our objectives were to determine: 
1) how DOD’s portfolio of 79 major defense acquisitions performed over time in 
terms of both cost and schedule; 
2) to what extent 43 selected weapon acquisition programs demonstrated key 
product knowledge at specific milestones in the acquisition process; 
3) to what extent 43 current and 12 future major acquisition programs implemented 




Observations on the cost and schedule performance 
of DOD’s major acquisition programs 
Changes across portfolios 
1. When compared to the 2014 portfolio, the cost of the 2015 portfolio decreased by nearly $15 billion from 
$1,455 to $1,440 billion and the number of programs in the portfolio increased by one to 79.* 
2. The total amount of funding required for the portfolio has been decreasing since 2010. The future funding 
needed to complete the portfolio—$603 billion—is at its lowest point in over a decade. Of this future funding, 
$571 billion is for procurement and $32 billion is for development. The low amount of future development 
funding required is likely due to newer programs with less risk entering system development. 
Changes in the 2015 portfolio 
3. When analyzing the change to cost and schedule estimates over the past year for the 79 programs in the 
2015 portfolio, the estimated total acquisition cost decreased by $2.5 billion and the average schedule delay 
in achieving initial capability increased by 2.4 months. When assessed against first full estimates, total costs 
have increased by $469 billion, over 48 percent, and the average delay in delivering initial capabilities has 
increased to almost 30 months. 
Factors that explain changes in the 2015 portfolio 
4. Older programs carry a majority of the total cost and cost growth since first full estimates. Of the 79 
programs in the 2015 portfolio, 40 were also in the 2005 portfolio representing 80 percent of the 
portfolio’s total acquisition cost.  
5. While the total cost of the 2015 portfolio decreased, 42 of the 79 programs increased in cost over the past 
year. Cost estimate decreases on 37 programs resulted in the overall net cost decrease. 
Page 6 *We exclude the Ballistic Missile Defense System as its reported baselines are not comparable with other programs. 
Observations on the cost and schedule performance 
of DOD’s major acquisition programs 
Factors that explain changes in the 2015 portfolio and other observations 
6. 38 programs gained buying power during the past year resulting in a net gain of $10.7 billion.  Six 
programs have demonstrated buying power gains or losses annually over the past 5 years. 
7. Schedule delays over the past year in 11 of the 79 programs contributed to the portfolio’s overall delay of 
2.4 months. The Airborne Maritime/Fixed Station radio system experienced the largest delay at more than 8 
years, which disproportionately affected the portfolio. 
8. Over the past year, 16 programs reported development cost growth while in production. This 
represents concurrency, which can be caused by many factors, and is a contributor to cost growth. 
9. As measured against the metrics discussed with the Office of Management and Budget and DOD, 
more programs meet each metric for cost change than our last assessment.  
10. The total cost of the portfolio estimated for Army programs is the smallest of the services and has 
been decreasing since 2007. The Navy and Air Force’s share of portfolio costs have been increasing 
since 2007 and 2012 respectively. Navy programs account for almost 55 percent of the 2015 
portfolio’s total estimated acquisition cost. 
11. The equity prices of contractors delivering the ten costliest programs performed well relative to 
broad-based market indices, indicating that investors expect them to remain profitable in the future. 
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The decrease in cost from the 2014 portfolio to the 2015 
portfolio continues a trend identified in previous assessments 
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OBJ. 1 Obs. 2: Portfolio Comparisons 
Note: The 2009 portfolio is excluded because there were no annual Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR)  released for the December 
2008 submission date.  
DOD Portfolio Cost and Size, 2005-2015 
• DOD’s portfolio has been steadily decreasing in terms of cost since 2010. 
• Over half, or 40 of the 79 programs in the 2015 portfolio, were also in the 2005 portfolio and 
represent 80 percent of the portfolio’s current total acquisition cost or over $1.1 of the $1.4 trillion. 
The total amount of funding required for the portfolio has been decreasing since 
2010, the amount needed to complete the portfolio—$603 billion—is at its lowest 
point in over a decade 
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Future Development and Procurement Funding in Comparison to Invested Funding by Year,  2005-2015 
• Overall, the amount of total funding needed to complete the portfolio has been decreasing since 
2006 and is currently $603 billion or 42 percent of the portfolio’s total cost.  
• Of note is the decrease in the amount of development funding needed to complete the portfolio. 
Only $32 billion in development remains to be appropriated down from almost $128 billion in 2005.  
Fiscal year 2016 dollars (in billions) 
OBJ. 1 Obs. 2:  Portfolio Comparisons 
 
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 
Note: The 2009 portfolio is excluded because there were no annual SARs released for the December 2008 submission date.  
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Over the past year, the estimated cost of the 2015 portfolio decreased by $2.5 
billion, the average delay in achieving initial capability increased by 2.4 months 
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Cost and Schedule Change for the 79 Programs in the 2015 Portfolio 
Fiscal year 2016 dollars (in billions) 
Estimated 
portfolio cost in 
2014 
Estimated 








Total estimated research and development cost  $285.9   $289.0   $3.1  1.1% 
Total estimated procurement cost 1,143.5 1,137.6 -6.0 -0.5 
Total estimated acquisition cost  1,442.0 1,439.6 -2.5 -0.2 
Average delay from first full estimate in delivering initial 
capabilities  







• The total procurement cost decreased, similar to our last assessment. 
• The 2.4 month average delay in delivering operational capability is a month greater than 
our last assessment and continues a trend we have seen for the past decade. 
• When measured from first full estimates the total estimated cost of the portfolio has 
grown by over 48 percent, or nearly $469 billion. 
• Eighty percent of cost growth since first full estimates occurred five or more years ago.  
OBJ. 1 Obs. 3:  Changes over the Past Year in the 2015 Portfolio 
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 
Note:  In addition to research and development and procurement costs, total acquisition cost includes acquisition related operation and maintenance and 
system-specific military construction costs. Some numbers may not sum due to rounding. 
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Page 11 
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 
Although the total cost for the 2015 portfolio decreased, 42 of 79 programs increased in cost 
over the past year, the cost decreases on the remaining 37 programs resulted in the net cost 
decrease 
• Unlike previous assessments there were fewer programs at the extremes of the distribution with 
significant cost changes, i.e. no “outliers”. 
• Cost changes resulted from a variety of program changes, including changes to program quantities. 
37 programs had cost 
decreases. 
42 programs had cost 
increases 
OBJ. 1 Obs. 5:  Distribution of 1-year Total Acquisition Cost Change 
Accounting for quantity changes, 38 programs in the portfolio gained buying 










Cost change not 
attributable to 
quantity 
Increased buying power 38 $10.6 -$5.4 -$16.0 
Procurement cost decreased with no quantity change 26 $0.0 -$10.6 -$10.6 
Quantity increased with less cost increase than anticipated 11 $10.6 $5.9 -$4.7 
Quantity decreased with more cost decrease than anticipated 1 -$.06 -$0.7 -$0.7 
Decreased buying power 35 -$4.2 $1.1 $5.3 
Procurement cost increased with no quantity change 25 $0.0 $2.0 $2.0 
Quantity increased with more cost increase than anticipated 6 $4.9 $5.5 $0.6 
Quantity decreased with less cost decrease than anticipated 4 -$9.1 -$6.3 $2.8 
No change in buying power 5 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 
Program eliminated procurement 1 -$1.7 -$1.7 $0.0 
Portfolio totals 79 $4.7 -$6.0 -$10.7 
OBJ. 1 Obs. 6:  Buying Power Analysis 
Procurement Cost Changes in the 2015 Portfolio due to Quantity Changes and Other Factors 
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 
Fiscal year 2016 dollars (in billions) 
• Our analysis shows that 38 programs increased their buying power in the past year and reduced procurement costs 
by a total of $5.4 billion. This total is the net amount of cost change given the $10.6 billion in increases due to quantity 
increases and the $16 billion in decreases due to other program efficiencies.  
• These buying power gains outweighed losses resulting in a net buying power gain of $10.7 billion. 
The total cost of the portfolio estimated for Army programs is the smallest of the 
services and has been decreasing since 2007. The Navy and Air Force’s share of 
portfolio costs have been increasing. 
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OBJ. 1 Obs. 10: Services’ Share of Portfolio Cost 
Services’ Percentage of Total Portfolio, 2005-2015 
Air Force 
Army • Spending on Navy programs now 
accounts for 55 percent of the 
portfolio or $54.6 billion. 
 
• As the share of cost for Navy 
programs increased, that for the 
Army has decreased, it is now at 10 
percent of the portfolio. 
 
• Some Navy programs, shipbuilding 
in particular, have experienced 
significant cost growth. 
 
• In a constrained funding 
environment, unforeseen cost 
increases limit investment choices. 
The equity prices of the contractors delivering the ten costliest programs have 
performed well relative to broad-based market indices, indicating that investors 
expect these firms to remain profitable well into the future 
• Five publicly-traded defense contractors are developing and 
delivering the ten largest DOD programs in the 2015 portfolio. 
• These 10 programs account for $866 billion in acquisition costs, 
over 60 percent of the total portfolio. 
• The equity prices—a stock price-based indicator of investor 
expectations of future earnings over many years—for these 
contractors over the past decade has increased at a rate that 
outperformed broad-based indices for markets as a whole, as well 
as narrower indices covering similar sectors of the economy.  
• This indicates that investors expect the performance of these 
companies to be particularly strong for some time to come. 
• Strong equity performance among these contractors could be 
driven by a number of factors and is not necessarily related to 
the financial condition of major acquisition programs. 
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OBJ. 1 Obs. 11: Industry Effects 
Of the 12 future programs we assessed, 5 identified critical technologies and their 
anticipated maturity levels 
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 Program Development start 
Projected to demonstrate all 
critical technologies in an 
operational environment 
Projected to complete 
all systems engineering 
reviews  
Plan to constrain 
system 
development  
T-AO(X) 06/2016  O  
IFPC Inc. 2 06/2016     
F-15 EPAWSS 09/2016 O   
OR  09/2016   O O 
PAR 03/2017   O O 
P-8A Inc. 3 06/2017   O O 
UCLASS 06/2017  --- O 
JSTARS Recap 09/2017 ---   
ITEP 06/2018 O O O 
LX(R) 09/2018   O O 
APT 12/2017   O  
WSF 12/2018 O O O 
• The best point of leverage to ensure a program’s success is at the start of a new program. At this point, decision makers can ensure 
that new programs implement best practices and exhibit desirable principles before they are approved and funded.  
• Three of the 12 programs plan to conduct all of the recommended systems engineering reviews before development start, including a 
system functional review, a system requirements review, and a preliminary design review.  
OBJ. 2 Obs. 1 – Development Start for Future Programs 
   Implementation planned 
O   No implementation planned 
--- Practice to be determined 
     Critical technologies have not been identified per the program office response 
The seven programs that started system development, or planned to, during our 
assessment period have knowledge deficits which introduce risk and could lead to 
cost and schedule growth 
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OBJ. 2 Obs. 1 – Development Start 
• OASuW Inc. 1 plans to 
have immature 
technologies at the 
start of system 
development. 
• None of the programs 
demonstrated critical 
technologies in an 
operational 
environment.  
• Five programs 
conducted all systems 
engineering reviews, 
including a preliminary 
design review, before 
entering system 
development.  
Of the five programs that held, or are planning to hold, a critical design review 
during our assessment period, two met all of the best practices 
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OBJ. 2 Obs. 2 – Critical Design Review 
• Two programs have not 
demonstrated mature 
technologies, yet all plan 
to release at least 90 
percent of drawings. 
 
• Two programs do not 
plan to test a system-
level integrated 
prototype. 
Of the five programs that held a production decision during our assessment period, 
one met all of the best practices, including demonstrating that critical processes are 
in statistical control 
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OBJ. 2 Obs. 3 – Production Start 
• SDB II met all of the best 
practices for production. 
 
• Three of the programs do not 
plan to test a production-
representative prototype 
before making a production 
decision. 
Objective 3: Observations on current and future programs 
implementation of acquisition reforms and initiatives 
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1. Of the 55 current and future programs we assessed, 37 have established an affordability constraint, 
similar to the implementation rate in our last assessment. The development cost growth for programs 
we assessed with an affordability constraint is 33 percentage points lower than the median 
development cost growth for programs without a constraint. 
2. Of the 43 current programs we assessed, 39 have conducted a “should-cost” analysis resulting in 
anticipated development and procurement savings of over $35 billion; approximately $21 billion of 
these savings have been realized to date.   
3. Of the 55 current and future programs we assessed, 43 plan to promote competition at some point 
during acquisition. Eight of the 43 current programs have no plans for competition before or after 
development start. Half of the future programs we assessed plan to conduct competitive prototyping. 
4. Of the 55 current and future programs we assessed, 40 reported software development as a high-risk 
area. Programs which did not report their software development as high-risk have experienced greater 
schedule delays. Sixteen of the 43 current programs we assessed plan to concurrently conduct 
production and software development. 
5. Sixteen of the 43 current programs we assessed are in production. Eleven of these programs plan to 
complete 30 percent or more of their developmental testing after production start. Further, three of 
these 11 programs plans to place more than 20 percent of procurement quantities under contract before 
testing is complete. For the programs we assessed, as concurrency increases, so does total 
acquisition cost growth. 
Of the 43 current programs we assessed, 39 have conducted a “should-cost” 
analysis resulting in anticipated savings of over $35 billion; approximately $21 
billion of these savings have been realized to date.  
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OBJ. 3 Obs. 2 - ACQUISITION INITIATIVES 
Of the 39 programs, 35 identified approximately $35 billion 
in realized and future savings. 
• $21.2 billion of this has been realized.  
• Programs reported that nearly $286 million of 
those savings were used to offset budget cuts 
required by sequestration.  
• Programs may not have strong incentives to realize or 
report “should-cost” savings if they result in the funding 
of other DOD priorities. 
 
Programs cited several activities as responsible for some or 
all of their “should-cost” savings, including:  
 
• efficiencies realized through contract negotiations (15 
programs),  
• design trades to balance affordability and capability (12 
programs), and 
• developmental or operational testing efficiencies (7 
programs). 
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OBJ. 3 Obs. 3 - ACQUISITION INITIATIVES 
Of the 55 current and future programs we assessed 43 have acquisition strategies that include 
some strategies for encouraging competition, eight will not conduct a competition, and 4 are 
unsure of their approach at this time 
Current Programs’ Plans to Promote Competition Future Programs’ Plans to Promote Competition 
Program assessments 
• There are currently 55 programs that will be covered in assessments 
• 42 2-page 
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2-page assessments 
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Requirements Really Matter 
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Requirements Knowledge Is Critical 
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• Positive acquisition outcomes require the use of a knowledge-based approach to product 
development that demonstrates high levels of knowledge before significant commitments 
are made—knowledge supplants risk over time.  
 
• An executable program business case must demonstrate a match between requirements 







• Keys to achieving a match: 
• Clearly defined and understood requirements – down to at least a completed preliminary design  









What Are Requirements? 
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• It depends, because “where you sit determines where you stand” 
 
• Operational requirements  
• Typically rooted in capability gaps 
• Establish capability needs and set operational goals 
• Provide the high-level success criteria 
 
• Design requirements 
• Also known as derived requirements or specifications  
• Identify the key subsystems (technologies) and interfaces through 
preliminary design and ultimately full (or critical) design 
• Provide a clear understanding of technical / design feasibility of a system 
Requirements Creep or Knowledge Gained? 
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• For Major Defense Acquisition Programs, operational requirements like Key 
Performance Parameters, don’t tend to change after development begins, 
but as operational requirements are decomposed the number of design 
requirements (i.e. specifications) grows significantly, often giving the 
appearance of “creep.” 
 
• Growth in the number of design requirements is a natural process for 
every system as requirements are decomposed and the system design 
matures. 
Source: GAO-15-469 
Characteristics of More Successful Programs 
• Incremental, Derivative, and/or Prototypes 
• Limited system complexity and high technology maturity 
• Requirements informed through systems engineering 
• Cost and schedule estimates informed through systems engineering 
 
• Examples include:  
• KC-46A  
• Joint Light Tactical Vehicle  












Typical DOD Program Start 
Best Practice Program Start 
Systems Engineering Builds Knowledge 
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• Implementation of the SE processes begins with the identification of a 
validated operational need.  
• The technical processes … include the top-down design processes and 
bottom-up realization processes that support transformation of operational 
needs into operational capabilities (i.e. a delivered weapon system). 
 
• During the Technology Development (TD) phase:  
• Program Manager and Systems Engineer work to reduce technical risk 
and develop a sufficient understanding of the materiel solution 
development  
• Validate design approaches and cost estimates, to refine 
requirements and to ensure affordability is designed in to the desired 
capability…(i.e. the top-down design processes cited above) 
Source: Defense Acquisition Guidebook 
The Requirements Part of Systems Engineering 
PRELIMINARY Page 31 
Considerations For Further Improving Weapon 
System Acquisition Performance 
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• Cultural shift to get rid of the “we can’t do that here” attitude 
• DOD 5000 is flexible and statute does not prohibit it 
• DOD programs have done it successfully 
• Think incremental or derivative—build on what is known 
 
• Consider knowledge as an independent variable—properly align decisions with 
knowledge, don’t try to force knowledge to the left of a schedule-driven process 
 
• Think outside the box about ways to work with the industrial base to better 
understand design requirements before program start 
• Different contracting types 
• Competition through PDR or even CDR 
• Require a “prototype or derivative solution” 
 
• Consider ways to work with the Congress to identify ways to invest in systems 
engineering knowledge — pay me now or pay me later 
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Acquisition Reform 
Efforts to Streamline DOD’s Acquisition 
Process and Reduce Burden on  
Commercial Companies 




• Recent Reform and Improvement Efforts 
• Impact of DOD’s Implementation of Reform Efforts on Internal 
Processes 
• Efforts to Streamline DOD’s Oversight of Acquisition Programs 
• Future Congressional Areas of Emphasis 
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Recent Reform and Improvement Efforts 
Adopt commercial practices and standards 
DAWIA 
Acquisition Reform of the 
90’s 
Defense Reform Initiative 
WSARA 
Better Buying Power 
Reduce infrastructure and overhead 
costs and improve business process  
Rebuild the acquisition workforce  
Improve acquisition program cost 
and schedule outcomes  
Improve DOD’s purchasing power 























Impact of DOD’s Implementation of Reform Efforts 
on Internal Processes 



















A B C 
Impact of DOD’s Implementation of Reform Efforts on 
Internal Processes 
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Efforts to Streamline DOD’s Oversight of Acquisition 
Programs 
FY 16 NDAA 
Milestone Decision Authority for most programs will now be the service acquisition executive instead of OSD 
Milestone Decision Authority makes a determination about an acquisition program’s “business case” at 
Milestone A and a certification at Milestone B 
OSD Systems Engineering and Developmental Test and Evaluation Offices will serve in an advisory role and are 
not directly in the chain of command for approving programs  
Some required documentation was eliminated – such as stand alone manpower estimates 
DOD Improvement Efforts 
OSD and the Navy are pilot testing a streamlined reporting process with the Next Generation Jammer program 
OSD delegated 24 programs to the services for oversight in FY 15 
OSD and the services are using an electronic coordination tool to review and approve acquisition strategies 
DAU is analyzing data it collected on 5 MDAPs related to the number of higher level reviews and the timeline for 
approval of key acquisition documents 
Future Congressional Areas of Emphasis 
• Obtaining Technologically Advanced Weapon Systems Quicker 
(Acquisition Agility) 
• Prototyping 
• Open Systems 
• Reducing Burden on Commercial Companies with Changes to: 
• Commercial Item Determinations 
• Other Transaction Authority 
• Technical Data Rights 
• Cost and Pricing Data 
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GAO Review on Reducing Burden on Commercial 
Companies 
• GAO is currently conducting a review to identify impediments 
innovative companies perceive or face when conducting 
business with DOD 
• We are conducting 12-15 case studies to illustrate the 
impediments companies face. The majority of the 
companies are involved with cyber security, data analytics, 
or robotics. 




GAO Review on Reducing Burden on Commercial 
Companies 
• Most common concerns: 
• Lengthy decision-making process (commercial item and 
price reasonableness determinations) 
• Multiple, costly software certifications 
• Unstable funding and budget inflexibility 
• Intellectual property rights 
• Requirements that are too prescriptive 
• Difficulty identifying business opportunities 
• Acquisition workforce lacks subject-matter and technical 
expertise 
• Risk averse workforce 
• Rotating DOD workforce 
Page 43 
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